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Introduction
The theory of the utility-maximizing consumer enjoys widespread acceptance and use in economics. The objective of this theory is to describe the way in which consumption of a good depends on the consumer's income and the prices he faces. In recent years much progress has been made in combining this theory with the empirical analysis of consumption data. The data are used to test the theory, and the theory is used to provide structure to the empirical analysis. This work is known as the systemwide approach in which demand equations for all n goods are estimated simultaneously. For surveys of these developments, see Barten (1977) , Brown and Deaton (1972) , Phlips (1974) , Powell (1974) , Theil (1975 Theil ( /76, 1980a and Theil and Clements (1987) .
A leading example of a system of demand equations is the Rotterdam model, due to Barten (1964) and Theil (1965) ; the name "Rotterdam" comes from the location of Barten and Theil in the 1960s. This model has strong links with the economic theory of the consumer and its elegant simplicity has contributed to its popularity and influential role in the development of the system-wide approach.
The objective of this paper is to give a self-contained account of the Rotterdam model so that it is accessible to nonspecialists and to indicate how it may be of use in marketing research. The most frequent use of the model involves the demand for broad commodity groups such as food, clothing, housing and so on. For marketing purposes, however, these groups are much too broad. Fortunately, under certain conditions the model can be reformulated so that it can be applied to narrower groups of goods such as beer, wine and spirits or different brands of a certain product. But even with reformulation, to make the model of further use in marketing requires extensions to deal with
Differential Demand Equations
We write Pi, qi for the price and quantity of good i (i = 1, ..., n). The consumer behaves as if he chooses ql, . . ., qn to maximize his utility function, u(ql, . .., qn), subject to the budget constraint M = IZn= piqi, Mbeing income. The optimal quantities obviously depend on income and prices, so we write The n X n matrix [rij] is negative semidefinite with rank (n -1). Demand homogeneity implies that an equiproportionate change in all prices has no effect on consumption, while Slutsky symmetry implies that the substitution effects of price changes are symmetric. Dividing both sides of (2.5) by wi, we obtain Oi/wi as the income elasticity of demand for i; and rij/wi as the (i, j)th price elasticity.
The Rotterdam Model
The differential demand equations presented in the last section are in terms of infinitesimal changes. The Rotterdam model is simply a finite-change version of these demand equations. To obtain the relative price version of the Rotterdam model we make the following adjustments to (2.2). The budget share wi is replaced with the arithmetic average of the budget share in t -1 and t, wi = ?(w,i + wi,t_); d(log qi) is replaced with the change in the logarithm of qi from period t -1 to t, Dqi, = log qit -log qi,tl; d(log Q) is replaced with DQt = 2, wi, Dqit; d(log pj) is replaced with Dpjt = log pjt -log pj,t-i; and d(log P') with DP' = I?= OiDpi,.
The marginal share and price coefficients in (2.2) are not necessarily constant. In the Rotterdam model, as a simplification these are treated as constants. After making the above adjustments to (2.2) we obtain The Slutsky coefficients in (3.2) are subject to the homogeneity and symmetry constraints (2.6) and (2.7). As can be seen, (3.2) and the constraints are all linear in the parameters which makes estimation and hypothesis testing straightforward.
Aggregation over Individual Consumers
The demand equations derived above are based on the utility-maximizing behaviour of the individual consumer. As data in economics are usually available only in aggregate form, it is natural to raise the question, to what extent do the previous results carry over to the aggregate or market demand functions? In this section, which is mainly based on Barnett (1979) , Selvanathan (1987) and Theil (1975/76) , we use the convergence approach to aggregation to analyse this problem. This approach is a statistical tool which is used to analyse the market demand functions when the size of the consumer population becomes very large.
The Micro and Macro Demand Equations
Consider equation (2.5), the absolute price version of the differential demand equation for good i. As that equation refers to an individual consumer we add a consumer subscript c, n wicd(log qic) = Oicd(log Qc) + 7rijcd(log pj), c = 1,.. ., N, where we have also used plimN,, op(1) = 0. Equation (4.6) is the macro analogue of the micro demand equation (4.1). The coefficients of (4.6) satisfy the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions (2.6) and (2.7). Consequently, the convergence approach reveals that all of the restrictions at the individual consumer level carry over to the aggregate equations. This is the justification for applying the Rotterdam model to aggregate data. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, in what follows we shall not distinguish between micro coefficients and variables and their macro counterparts.
The above results are very appealing as they imply that the microeconomic theory of the consumer is directly applicable with aggregate data. The homogeneity and symmetry constraints play the role of reducing the number of free parameters to be estimated; and more often than not prices are highly collinear making it impossible to estimate parameters precisely without these constraints. It should nevertheless be acknowledged that the use of aggregate data can yield information about demand behaviour at the aggregate level only, not at the individual level. While some marketing applications no doubt require details of the heterogeneity at the individual level, for others aggregate level inferences are sufficient. An example of the latter is the case of alcoholic beverages in Australia where one of the major marketing decisions faced by brewers in recent years is whether or not beer and wine are closely competing for the drinker's dollar. This example will be taken up below.
In concluding this section, we should note a caveat regarding the convergence approach. Equations (4.4) and (4.5) contain an Op(l) term with plimNo, op(l) = 0. Like all probability statements, this convergence result cannot of course guarantee that the actual value of this term is zero. It should also be pointed out that not all applications of the Rotterdam model have been with aggregate data. The use of micro data to estimate the model requires that prices vary across individuals, as is the case with panel data. A recent example of this approach is Kiefer (1984) . These micro applications are still quite rare due to the lack of databases containing cross-sectional price variability.
The Demand for Groups of Goods and Conditional Demand Equations
The analysis thus far has dealt with the demand for all n goods. We now show how to analyse the demand for a subset or group of goods.
Block-Independent Preferences
Let the n goods now be divided into G groups, S1, ..., SG, such that each good belongs to only one group. Further, let the consumer's preferences be such that the utility function is the sum of G subutility functions, each involving the quantities of only one group, By dividing both sides of (5.8) by wit, we find that 0 Wgt/wit = (Owi/)/(Og/Wgt) is the ratio of the income elasticity of i to that of the group to which the good belongs. We shall refer to this ratio as the conditional income elasticity of i. We also find that 7rj/it is the conditional price elasticity, i.e. the elasticity of qi with respect to the absolute price pj (i, j E Sg). These conditional elasticities hold constant total consumption of the group, as measured by the Divisia volume index DQg,.
As 
A Two-Level Decision Hierarchy
It is to be noted that the variables of (5.8) deal only with the group to which the good belongs. Consequently, conditional demand functions allow us to ignore the prices of the goods outside the group in question. As will be seen in the next section, this allows us to analyse the demand for quite narrowly defined goods.
Block-independent preferences imply that the consumer's problem can be solved in two steps. The first decision involves the allocation of income to the G groups, as described by the G group demand equations (5.4). Each of these demand equations contains real income and the relative price of the group in question, but not the prices of the individual goods. Then in the second decision, for each of the groups, expenditure is allocated to the goods within the group. The conditional demand equations (5.8) describe this allocation and they contain total consumption of the group, as determined by the previous decision, and relative prices within the group. Accordingly, there is a two-level decision hierarchy under block independence. In many applications such a separation into levels of the consumer's decision problem makes good intuitive sense. This is illustrated below with the demand for alcoholic beverages. Under block inde-pendence, the consumer determines expenditure on total alcohol in the first step; and then in the second step that expenditure is allocated to beer, wine and spirits as a function of the relative prices of the beverages. Table 1 (constant terms are included to take account of trend-like changes in tastes, etc., but these are not reported in the table). These estimates are constrained by the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions (5.9) and (5.10). For the details of the estimation procedure see Appendix A3, available on request.
The conditional marginal shares given in Table 1 indicate that when alcohol expenditure increases by $1, expenditure on beer rises by $0.59, wine by $0.10, with the remaining $0.31 being spent on spirits. We give only the upper triangle of the matrix of conditional Slutsky coefficients as it is symmetric. All the diagonal elements of this matrix are negative, as they should be, and the off-diagonal elements are all positive. The characteristic roots of the conditional Slutsky matrix are all nonpositive, which verifies that this matrix is negative semidefinite. In Appendix A2 we show that the data are not inconsistent with the assumption that the alcoholic beverages are block independent.
The upper part of Table 2 gives the conditional demand elasticities implied by the Australian estimates contained in Table 1 . These are conditional in that total expenditure on alcohol is held constant, so that they deal with inter-beverage competition. The conditional income elasticities are 0.8, 0.8 and 2.0 for beer, wine and spirits, respectively. These indicate that, within alcohol, beer and wine are necessities (having elasticities less than one), while spirits is a strong luxury. The high elasticity for spirits agrees well with the notion that in Australia the more affluent tend to be spirits drinkers. All the conditional price elasticities are less than one in absolute value, the own-price elasticities being -0.1, -0.4 and -0.4 for beer, wine and spirits. The conditional cross-price elasticities are all positive, indicating that the three beverages are pairwise substitutes. As expected, there is only a moderate amount of substitutability between the three beverages. The corresponding unconditional elasticities are These elasticities hold real income constant and allow total alcohol expenditure to vary. The middle and lower parts of Table 2 
A Marketing Application: Identifying Market Structure
The analysis of market structure in marketing is concerned with identifying closelycompeting brands of the same product. This analysis refers to those factors determining the probability of the consumer choosing one brand of a certain product, rather than another. These factors include the degree of consumer loyalty, which determines the pattern of repeat-buying; the nature of competition from other brands, which in part relates to the probability of switching brands; the evolution of consumer perception of As can be seen, using the degree of utility interaction of the beverages (as measured by the vij's) is a very appealing way to analyse the degree of competition between beverages i and j. In contrast to the approaches in the marketing literature, it is a theory-based procedure for identifying market structure.
Extending the Rotterdam Model to Deal with Advertising
In the previous sections we used the Rotterdam model to analyse the effect of income and prices on the demand for the alcoholic beverages. The model can be extended to incorporate the role of other elements of the marketing mix (e.g. advertising, product quality, distribution) in determining consumption. In this section we restrict ourselves to advertising. As our objective is to illustrate how the Rotterdam model can be extended to deal with advertising, we mainly consider only a very simple case and just mention more general formulations.
Advertising and Utility
We postulate that a one percent increase in advertising of good i changes the logarithm of the marginal utility of that good, log (au/8qi), by a positive constant j, a(la d1 (8.1)
where ai is a measure of the volume of advertising for good i. The coefficient I is interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal utility of good i with respect to its advertising.
Conditional Demand Equations with Advertising
The conditional demand equation for i E Sg under block independence is given by (5.5). When the model is extended to deal with advertising by using (8.1), it can be shown (Theil 1980b Table 3 . As before, these estimates are constrained by the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions.
The estimate of t given in Table 3 is significantly positive. Its value indicates that when advertising on beverage i is increased by ten percent then the marginal utility of that beverage increases by 5.6 percent, all other variables remaining unchanged. Table 4 explores the implications of this estimate by presenting the conditional advertising elasticities. Consider the first row of this table, that for beer. The first entry is 0.10; this indicates that a ten percent increase in the advertising of beer raises beer sales by one percent (all other variables held constant). The second entry of -0.06 implies that a ten percent rise in wine advertising depresses beer sales by 0.6 percent, so that beer and wine are competitive, as expected. The last entry of -0.04 indicates that beer sales fall by 0.4 percent as a result of a 10 percent increase in spirits advertising. Note that the sum of these effects is zero (1 -0.6 -0.4 = 0), reflecting the fact that an equiproportional increase in advertising of all beverages has a cancelling effect. In this application it turns out that the corresponding unconditional elasticities are approximately equal to their conditional counterparts.
Further Extensions
There are two generalizations of the above extension of the Rotterdam model. First, equation (8.1) specifies that a one percent increase in advertising of good i changes the logarithm of that good's marginal utility by A, which is the same for all goods. As some goods are more sensitive to advertising than others, this specification can be generalized by replacing t with one parameter for each good in the group, ti,..., Ang. This can be extended still further by allowing advertising of good j to directly affect the marginal utility of i, so that (8.1) becomes (l9 dlogu) o(log aj)
, j= l1. .
For the corresponding demand model, see Selvanathan (1987) . Second, it is reasonable to postulate that in addition to current advertising, past advertising also affects current sales. This can be handled by interpreting the variable ai as the stock of accumulated advertising, rather than the current flow of advertising expenditure. This approach is used by Selvanathan (1987) . Using the U.K. data, he is, however, unable to reject the hypothesis that the effects last for one year only.
Alternatives to the Rotterdam Model
In addition to the Rotterdam model there are a number of other system-wide demand models, the most popular being the linear expenditure system (LES), the translog model and the almost ideal demand system (AIDS); see Theil and Clements (1987) for a survey. While these share some features with the Rotterdam model, there are a number of differences.
The utility function underlying the LES is the sum of n subutility functions, one for each good. This form of the utility function implies that each marginal utility is independent of the consumption of the other goods, a characteristic known as preference independence. As most narrowly defined goods could not be expected to exhibit this property, the LES is probably too rigid for marketing applications.
The translog model and AIDS are more general than the LES as they are capable of dealing with the interaction of goods in the utility function. Like the Rotterdam model, these models can be used to test the hypotheses of homogeneity and symmetry. The translog and AIDS are both based on the algebraic specification of the form of the utility function (strictly speaking, the indirect utility function and the cost function), a property shared by the LES. By contrast, the Rotterdam model is a first-order approximation to completely general demand equations and is thus approximately consistent with a wide variety of forms of the underlying utility function. In this sense, the model is more attractive than its competitors. However, until more comparative studies are available, one cannot be dogmatic and state definitely that one model will always dominate the others.
The idea of the Rotterdam model as an approximation to the true demand equations leads to a wider class of model, known as differential demand equations (Theil 1980a) . Within this class the "coefficients" are not necessarily constant and can vary with income and prices. For example, the marginal share 0i in the Rotterdam model is specified as a constant; as an alternative, we could specify that this share equals a constant plus the corresponding budget share to give another member of the class, known as Working's (1943) model which has been recently used by Theil et al. (1981) . It is possible to devise numerous other members of the class which may be useful in marketing research. For further details, see Theil (1979) .
Concluding Comments
In this paper we have presented a self-contained exposition of the Rotterdam model which is a leading example of a system of consumer demand equations. The model has strong links with the economic theory of the consumer and is attractive for its elegant simplicity. We showed that although the model is based on the theory of the individual consumer, it can nonetheless be applied to aggregate data.
To illustrate how the model could be employed in marketing research, we used the consumption of beer, wine and spirits. When the alcoholic beverages are block independent in the consumer's utility function, the analyst can confine his attention to variables pertaining to those goods only. One of the features of the Rotterdam model is that the hypothesis of block independence can be tested in a straightforward way. The alcohol application included the marketing topics of identifying market structure and advertising. Our hope is that this paper will inspire marketing researchers to use the As can be seen, the off-diagonal vj's involving all other goods are insignificant. A likelihood ratio test of(A2.2) yields a X2 value of 1.46 which is not significant. Accordingly, we are unable to reject block independence.
